ABSTRACT: David Wallace-Wells' July 2017 New York magazine article on climate change effects entitled "The Uninhabitable Earth" gained a large and drastically polarized readership whose reactions veered from horrified appreciation to utter rejection of the author and the several scientists he cites. This publishing event put on display contemporary mistrust of science. The analysis of trust and authority demonstrates that these terms conceal a great deal of ambivalence. When authority is corrupted, the effect is not ambivalence but disorientation. If trust is often impossible, as it appears to be in contemporary climate debates, a suitably pessimistic politics can be found in Fisher and Ury's phrase "proceed independent of trust."
INTRODUCTION
Have you read as much junk as I have? We must talk about junk! Facts are becoming harder and harder, more elusive. We're in a muddle, a mess. There's such a racket going on. There are so many lies around, readers are beginning to think: don't bother me with whether this is true or not true; I'm busy. (Renata Adler in Cook, 2013, 7 July) David Wallace-Wells created a minor public sensation with his July 2017 New York magazine article on climate change effects entitled "The Uninhabitable Earth." Under seven headingsHeat Death, The End of Food, Climate Plagues, Unbreathable Air, Perpetual War, Permanent Economic Collapse, and Poisoned Oceans-plus a peroration on why this information cannot get through our contemporary cultural "filters," Wallace-Wells puts forth a terrifying vision of human life on earth in the near-at-hand 2050 to 2100 year range. Some readers were horrified but appreciative (Matthews, 2017) . For others it was an occasion to express mistrust of climate science, science in general, and expertise, a phenomenon recently commented upon at length by Nichols in the book The Death of Expertise and others (Nichols, 2017; McIntyre, 2018; Osnes, 2018) . Probably largely because Wallace-Wells had cited the scientists so extensively, some credentialed and even noted climate scientists attacked the article for its errors and especially the author's alarmism (Scientists explain, 2017) , alarmism being, on cool reflection, a fault likely more strategic and rhetorical than scientific.
One hardly needs to be a climate scientist to dispose of Wallace-Wells' work, and this is rather the point of the post-truth, end of expertise moment. It is as if all of the noble devices of the famous liberal arts "critical thinking," have grown up in monstrous form to bring to a twisted and cacophonous end our public life. Anyone who has had a media studies course can easily dismiss Wallace-Wells for writing in conclusions, providing no data or accounts of research methods, and neglecting the usual cautious statements of limitations and misgivings that often accompany academic and scientific writing. New York magazine published WallaceWells' extensive documentation almost immediately after the publication of the original article, but it did not matter. The critical thinker knows all journalism is ". . . superficial, formulaic, and dull" (Crouse, 1973, p. 31) , the term "dull" being substituted in some critiques by "authoritative"-meaning pretending to definitiveness and unearned authority (Tuchman, 1972, p.676; Steinem, 1974, p. 78) . These and many other critical ideas have been well taught and now take residence in the minds of educated people and the less educated people who imitate them. It is not uncommon to find in our public discourse the sophomoric performance of doubt and fallacy identification, "it might be otherwise," and who stands to profit, used to obliterate an article by David Wallace-Wells or anyone else, or, we must suppose, provide a global rationalization for why one should not bother to read him (or anyone else) in the first place. When people learn the argumentum ad ignorantiam is reversible (Walton, 1996, p. 26) , they resent that the academic authority's ignorance represents the potential for future knowledge, and their own ignorance is a deficit to be used against them, they are positioned to protest that all arguments are conducted in ignorance. It is possible to righteously reject Wallace-Wells from the slender bit of conscience afforded by our "intellectual scruples" in an act of bad faith (The Ethical Skeptic, n.d.).
The fair reader, able to slip criteria to fit the genre, knows Wallace-Wells' point is not to precisely delineate the course of time, but to play Cassandra or Jeremiah, or any other selfdenying prophet, who, in the knowledge that our choices materially matter, means to negate by fair warning a terrible future. Grace Andrus de Laguna (1927) in her work on the evolution of speech writes of the cry of alarm so elemental to objective survival it appears across species (pp. 20-80). If it is absurd to compare the chemical releases of social insects (Wyatt, 2009, pp. 611-616) to an elaborate synthesis of scientific literature warning of climate change in a century span, the absurdity is in the obstacles to efficiently acting on the latter. The prophet stings us to listen, to set aside our weaponized doubts and defensive positions and alliances, to open for amendment our familiar explanations, to realign our interests as we build here-to-for impossible but much more durable relationships. What if the point of an article like "The Uninhabitable Earth" is not about trusting journalists or the scientists Wallace-Wells lavishly cites, but having some sort of working relationship with those scientists and the many other conversants about any future at all that we can only achieve by collective discernment, commitment, care, and sacrifice? What if it is not so much the Earth that is becoming inhospitable to human life, but our conceptions of one-another as people who think and speak that is unsustainable? The analysis that follows takes up the problem of trust and authority in the spirit of these grave questions.
TRUST AND AUTHORITY
Each "discipline" or "profession" was characterized by, and organized as the custodian of, its own corpus of formal techniques, into which newcomers had to be initiated and accredited, as apprentices. (Stephen Toulmin, "From form to function," 1977, p. 159) In what follows there is the persistent assumption that when millions of people dismiss, say, climate science, we are encountering a problem of trust in authority. Tönnies (2001) writes in an approving and commonsensical way about authority, observing that it is always derived from the will of the community and includes special freedom and honor in a specific sphere of life; authority is earned via particular service to the community (p.32). The literature on trust in authority draws a distinction between the potentially malignant authority of a state (DeGeorge, 1985) , and the usually innocent authority of the researcher, teacher, or practicing professional (Origgi, 2004) . The two kinds of authority intertwine in actual societies, as in the much read analysis of dioxin advocacy in Ames, Iowa, where expertise from the Iowa State University Department of Mechanical Engineering more than bolstered the City staff and Council in their denials of public danger (Carolan & Bell, 2003, p. 242) . It is important to say that in the sociopolitical process of speaking and listening, almost every advocate seeks a kind of trust from the audience members, whether or not the speaker is preconceived as an authority of any kind; but trust without authority would never be a frame for understanding environmental scientists and journalists who write about science of great policy interest to potentially international-sized audiences. Sennett (1981) argues that one of the most enduring fruits of the French Revolution is the strategic proposition that to dethrone the King one must attack the King's legitimacy (p. 41). This advice seems to "be in the air" in recent times, with the outcome that many institutions have been attacked as if their legitimacy is in doubt. Science has not been immune from these attacks. The discourse of science likely was compromised when it was seen as playing a part in politics, for politics taints every discourse it touches (Nisbet, 1975; Lyotard, 1984) . Scientists and non-scientists have long been engaged with the problem of the legitimacy of science broadly understood and with the justification of specific scientific projects. It has been longer understood that the legitimacy of science would be attacked from the political left; it is disconcerting that as specific conflicts have arisen, the attacks have come with special vituperance from the political right. The first book-length works of Habermas (1970; published in English were very much concerned with the legitimacy of science, and especially technology careers, that ignored the conscience of the practitioners in a ruthlessly instrumental paradigm of productivity. Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge takes as its central problem the rationale for science in an age that has no patience for the traditional grand narratives that have justified it (1984) . As in Adorno's argument that science founders when it is known only as a method (1973, p. 72 ), Lyotard finds it impossible for science to legitimate itself (pp. 26, 38-40) . One may not be pleased to say these things, but the evidence of popular doubts about science are too extensive to ignore. Employing Origgi's (2017) language, the whole problem might vanish, if only, the best science came with "robust signals" of reputation, easily decoded by an earnest public of democratic citizens (p. 129). Alas, the medium is too often narrow, the signal weak, and the channel full of competing noise. With no bright reputation markers to distribute to the deserving, we are left with the difficulty of unpacking the problem of trust in authority.
ETHOS AND AMBIVALENCE
The battle between the old and new Gods is not an abstract opposition. The old Gods stand for the human necessity and ability to recognize the forces of nature, such as appetite and death, and to transform nature to human ends . . . The new Gods stand for political skill and wisdom, for the formation of political institutions. (Gillian Rose, 2009, p. 141) The human animal is cognitively brilliant, supposedly capable of doing at least a quadrillion logical operations per second. In the long period of human infant dependency children spend a disproportionate amount of this intellect studying the faces, voices, postures, and soon the language and inter-relationships of their caregivers. Gauging and adapting to the routines, energy shifts, interests, statuses, and moods of these elders is the infant's best strategy for maximizing its own care and wellbeing (Becker, 1971, pp. 1-16) . Human beings' first and principle study is other human beings, a subject about which each member of the species possesses massive, if largely inexpressible, knowledge. Within this knowing is myriad comparisons of confidence, mastery, strength, vulnerability, temperament, maturity, historical role, etc., across many life activities. For the individual person special attention is paid to "who I am" within my relationships, "where I fit" in these comparisons, and "how I am able to gain relative standing" in these activities. It is hardly the case that we are only recently self-aware enough to realize this is so. Human cultural groups have long forced self-feeling into the lives of their children and forced unmistakable status tokens into the practices of their communities (Becker, 1975, p. 10-13) .
Human beings' self-construction through social interaction includes what we analytically recognize as a massive moral component; Agnes Heller (1988) notes, my headache helps me understand all headaches, your blushing helps me understand my embarrassment, etc. (p. 24). The ordinary command of this corpus of knowledge includes awareness that the signs of a person's attitude, status, etc. can be ambiguated, faked (Eco, 1976) . Is it any surprise we easily find in English forty terms for "deception," thirty synonyms for "lying," thirty-one for "hypocrisy," twelve for "imposter," twenty-four for "concealment," thirty-one for "collusion," twenty-five for "hoax," and fifteen for "betrayal"? The terms for dishonesty run from suspicion-laden slang for the everyday hustler, to disappointment with subtle emotional insincerity, to sophisticated intellectual deflections, to outright criminality. We are, each of us and collectively, keen if disadvantaged students of human-made falsity, and its robust camouflage and denial, seemingly inherent in our situation as dependent symbolic creatures (Burke, 1961, pp. 298-309 ; on the ingenuity invested in signs of status and in faking signs of status, Felson, 1978) . On this matter Steven Mailloux (1989) shrewdly observes Twain in Huckleberry Finn, relies on ". . . readers' ability to recognize patterns of false argumentation, especially their ability to identify the dubious authorities to which the arguments appeal: superstition, clichéd romanticism, institutionalized morality, and ultimately racist ideology" (pp. 60-61).
The richness of the information we possess about other people, the felt complexity of our relationships with one another, has always been the stumbling block in Aristotle's simplistic three-part division of the resource of persuasion known as ethos: virtuous character, practical intelligence, and goodwill (toward these particular hearers on this occasion). Aristotle is surely correct in holding that the character of the speaker is most likely to be especially decisive when "exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided" (Roberts, 2004, p. 7) . Trusting other people is surely the single great human heuristic, commonly practiced and constrained by useful limits, both essential in crises marked by uncertainty as well as an efficient unguarded-ness in routine events (Frederiksen, 2016) . But there are so many competing and even contradicting virtues, varied species of practical knowledge possessed in so many degrees of completeness and confidence, and mixed or disguised intentions; it is impossible to reduce trustworthiness or its functional synonyms to a few factors for purposes of either making rhetorical criticisms or giving rhetorical advice. None of this, or what follows, is said to make the problem of ethos vanish into hopelessness under a blizzard of complexity. The point is to reconstitute the problem of the author in a field of ambivalence.
Consider, the morally virtuous part of the Aristotelian ethos equation could be unpacked at great length, but, minimally, Pincoffs (1986) found sixty-six virtue terms in English (p. 85); it is estimated there are 100,000 adjectives in English, suggesting that by direct, unequivocal description or metaphor, the virtue vocabulary is much larger than this. What stands out from Pincoff's list is that a great many of the terms describe a quietly cooperative person, quick to show kindness to others. But the second thing one observes from the list is that other terms require a risk-taking moral bravery and persistence that would, in practice, be anything but polite and self-effacing. The terms contradict or "counter-command." The ethicist might find the contradictions disqualifying, but the rhetorician thinks the plurality of virtues tells a great truth about the audience members who make protean demands on message makers and come to live with mixed satisfactions, ambivalence, about the communicator's performance and its outcomes.
Indeed, when it comes to who we follow, who we allow to speak for us, it is often the display of power, understood as violence or money or connection to the gods or the potency of a large number of followers (for a distinctly non-Aristotelian view of ethos see Farrell, 1993, pp. 289-291) , not virtue or surpassing knowledge, that makes it possible for a person or institution to gain a decisive audience and degrees of assent and finally deference. Canetti (1962) dedicates long sections of Crowds and Power to descriptions of the postures and gestures of the powerful, addressing by indirection the socio-logic of the performance of trustworthiness (pp. 203-219, 387-408; see also Becker, 1975, p. 50) . But the matter is not as straightforward as the display of dominance. Duncan (1968) sees everywhere in contemporary life a "cultivating tone" through which powerful figures assert themselves by making a display of their courtesy, their good listening, and their being the "larger person" in smaller things (pp. 220-221). There can be little surprise when there is a self-conscious development in some religious and other organizations of what is meant to be a paradox: servant leadership. Surely this deliberate "cultivating" includes making a display of one's quiet thoughtfulness, even of one's exhaustion in the process of "fairness." Plainly, we do not always want the most evidently morally good people, or the most highly credentialed people to speak to us and for us.
In her seminal article "Trust and Anti-trust" Baier (1986) unpacks the difference between trust and reliance or dependency, a valuable exercise that serves to underline that the two things cannot be separated in daily living. Kant (1784 Kant ( /1991 famously declares those who go along with authority are lazy and immature; but Kant seems to have momentarily forgotten the experience of needing a job, owing a debt, living in a garrison state, or even relying on the goodwill of others for social inclusion or personal care. Rosenstock-Huessy (1970) wryly observes that the nub of any person's biography is how far they can go with revealing the truth, because most of us "cannot go very far" in this tremendously punishing process (p. 75). As this is so for a speaker, so it must also be true of the listener: there are those people most of us dare not ignore or contravene, and the decision to comply with these peoples' words almost never has anything to do with the authority's virtue or education. Authorities may awe or terrify us, appear to be magnificent, or may have special knowledge by virtue of their insider social position or even esoteric knowledge obtained for inexplicable reasons.
Sometimes the ambivalence that grows out of our dependencies is a pragmatic calculation of self or collective interest, as when U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt supposedly said of Nicaraguan dictator Antonio Somoza, "Somoza is a son-of-bitch, but he's our son-of-abitch" (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2005, p. 1). Roosevelt's sentiment, applied to people's own personal dictators, surely echoes through daily life. But often our ambivalence is mixed around in complex social structures. Sennett (1981) describes a common relationship to authority figures in what he terms "bonds of rejection": ". . . there is a need for another person which is not safe to admit, but must be masked, rendered safe by declarations of rejection. Rejection of and a bond to the other person are inseparable" (pp. 27-28) . In this way people may make rueful jokes about the Prime Minister, give off-color slang names to the local police, and pen scatological rhymes on the bathroom walls about the school teacher-but still participate in these figure's institutions without serious doubt, follow attentively their remarks, obey their commands, and anxiously await their approval. No matter one's reservations about the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) , it is relevant here that in his studies most people's moral maturity tops out at a conventional "society maintaining" stage, a sense of negotiated order with, we must add, a built-in load of ambivalence.
It is important to understand that as conceived here, ambivalence about authority is neither a psychological problem nor an intellectual failure; it is a social accomplishment and a rhetorical resource. But it is obviously not a rhetorical resource that can easily be dropped into a text to advance, say, the reception of environmental science. What can be easily dropped into a text is a corrupted sense of authority.
AUTHORITY CORRUPTED
Now good men are the superiors of worse, the aged, speaking generally, of the youthful, and by consequence, parents of their offspring, husbands, again, of their wives and children, magistrates of their subjects. Universal reverence is no more than the proper due of all who are in any of these positions of authority . . . (Plato, "Laws," p. 1469) As Plato exemplifies, adherence to authority possesses a deep structural logic of subordination that justifies arbitrary, irrational, total domination far beyond the inevitable ambivalences of individuals in society. This Platonic sense of authority operates by command, is tautological, assertively metaphysical and probably theological; one cannot help but note the translators specify its effect is "universal reverence." If this were only Plato, if it only came from one important historical predecessor culture, we could dismiss this as aside our better democratic traditions. Sadly, the logic of authority is persistent in our cultural resources.
As a young scholar in the 1930s, Herbert Marcuse wrote "A Study on Authority" (1973). Marcuse shows in this detailed work the history of ideas that the familiar ambivalences of authority take the form of widely swinging antinomies in important texts that shaped the early modern era, and that influential thinkers subsequently embraced irrational authority as a deliberate strategy for society building and maintaining.
Marcuse begins with Martin Luther. Luther famously led one of the greatest rebellions in history, and then turned against the common people in favor of their princes. Marcuse writes, "In one of his fiercest passages about worldly authority, still in anti-authoritarian idiom, Luther calls the Princes of God 'jailers', 'hangmen' and 'bailiffs'" (p. 60), but then notes of Lutheran theology "From the other side, as seen by those subject to authority, in principle every 'under-person' is equal as a person to every 'over-person': with regard to 'inner' worthiness he can be vastly superior to authority. Despite this he must give his complete obedience" (pp. 60-61). Even the corruption of worldly authorities is for Luther never an occasion for "tumult and rebellion," for only the worldly authorities are "competent to punish wickedness" (p. 61). Luther even told Christian slaves they must not run away from their Turkish lords (pp. 63-64) . If this is a kind of crazy-making inconsistency, the internal consistency around authority is unmistakable. In both Luther and Calvin the inner life of faith and some otherworldly justice was reward enough for trials of bitter material oppression during one's earthly existence (pp. 69-70) . Luther added to his views the key comparison that drives home the domestic seat of authority: obeying one's parents is the model of one's relationship with the government (p. 75).
In Hegel states exist to preserve and protect property, and, a theme many others would soon imitate, that constitutions and royal lines must never appear to be human made but divine in origin and to be exalted (Marcuse, 1973, pp. 98-99) . Freed from any personal or historical origin, the state is elevated to a metaphysical necessity (p. 100), and as such ". . . the actual moral basis of authority . . . becomes meaningless . . ." (p. 103). Individuals, to the extent they obtain any social recognition whatsoever, gain it from the state or from a "corporation" such as a guild (p. 105), tertium non datur. Before and after Hegel a series of influential writers such as Edmund Burke, Joseph DeMaistre, Frederich Schlegel, and Friedrich Julius Stahl worked over these themes in a self-conscious conservatism in which the inferiority, at minimum the childlike quality, of the common people necessitated the ". . . social importance of authority" (Marcuse, 1973, pp. 115, 118) . Human reason could never be self-justifying as in Kant, and is always a danger to "pervert and destroy" great institutions, including property (pp. 114-115, 119) .
Edmund Burke wrote that the social hierarchy is both natural and impersonal yet charismatic, in which the incumbent in the seat of authority, conveniently, gets the charism (Marcuse, 1973, p. 113) . These thinkers celebrate faith, superstition, prejudice (a key term in Burke), tradition, and patriotism (pp. 115-117), reminding us that in the deep logic of loyalty when your dead are not my dead, I cannot trust you (Rothkrug, 2006, pp. 3-15) . The masses of people think of the sovereign nation-state as eternal, never created and to never be destroyed (Marcuse, 1973, p. 117) . Stahl argued that property was a gift from God and never earned, and therefore, like obedience to one's parents never to be questioned (pp. 124-125) . Around and around these thinkers circled property, the monarchy, the church, the parents, all over against individual initiative, merit, inquiry and reason, and democratic process. At the end of this line of thought, the emptiness of authority is its best justification.
Nearer the present, Anne Norton (1988) argues the neo-Freudian notion that in stress we are inclined to make very simplistic reductions of experience and search for father (fearsome) or mother (coaxing and soothing) leaders and authorities (pp. 133-137), though we understand it is usually the fearsome father who comes to the public mind in times of crisis. Our fearsome father leaders tend to practice diffused fear for its own sake (Norton, 1988, p. 135; Rose, 2017 , quoting George W. Bush in the 2000 U.S Presidential campaign, "We're not so sure who [the enemies of the U.S. are], but we know they're there", p. 140), exactly the kind of context we would not choose for confident information-seeking and democratic conversation. When this message of fear is not consistent with our experience, we endure disorientation. That the valuable, self-limiting, ambivalent, everyday heuristic of trust in authority can be, is, twisted into subservience calls for a higher pessimism about the human situation.
If we are tempted to call for respect for the authority of science, it is an exceedingly subtle operation to avoid a corrupted sense of authority in doing so. This is why it is reasonable to be pessimistic about rhetorically mending scientific authority., though surely there are higher and more effective pessimisms to adopt in going forward.
CONCLUSION
Recall that both Nisbet (1975) and Lyotard (1984) thought science had been injured by contact with politics. Still, it has become commonplace to argue that when it comes to climate change, science as we ordinarily understand and practice will not save us, only politics can do so (Giddens, 2009; Latour, 2004; as background, see also, Enzenberger, 1974) . Various idealizations of this rescuing politics have been offered, but given well-justified fears about corrupted notions of authority, it benefits us to consider a politics informed by a higher pessimism.
Peter Sloterdijk (2010) does not express his ideas in a measured way. He conceives of politics as employing vast "banks" of rage in the service of the "internal self-esteem" of warm blooded animals (pp. 12-21). Politics is a battle for recognition, in which people create "epics and tragedies" of self and social aggrandizement (pp. 7 & 42) . This is a very marked pessimism to be sure, though, oddly, Sloterdijk exempts environmental politics from the topics for possible rage; he says environmental problems are mere organizational, administrative, and "civilizational" tasks (p. 42). Contra Sloterdijk, we might think of David Wallace-Wells' "The Uninhabitable Earth" as a political rage, what Landow (1986) saw as the escalation toward the grotesque and finally doom in prophetic communication (pp. 57, 73-76) .
In his earlier work on cynicism we find Sloterdijk's (1987) best contribution to the politics of higher pessimism. He observes that cynicism is rage at discovering one has been deceived, that people are deceptive, and our personal intellectual armaments could never be strong enough to always prevent deception (pp. 403, 410, & 414) . Some people adapt to this experience of deception by taking on a cynical point of view that includes a hardboiled, shadowy, cleverness of their own, always telling a truth but always lying (pp. xxxviii & 546) ; others develop what he calls "kynicism," a brave, imaginative, "cheekiness" as in the ancient Cynic Diogenes (pp. 101-112). Sloterdijk (1987) describes current affairs as caught between two fixed ideas: nature is in shortage, and society is a war. These are stark propositions that dissolve our reassuring myths, especially the myth of communication (pp. 541-543). We desperately want to listen to the ". . . siren's melodies of communication and reconciliation" (p. 544), even though we know that more and better communication is not much of an answer when trust is in shreds. This is a thought with a long and complicated history, with elements running through General Semantics and humanistic psychology among other sources, but in communication studies many students have been taught that "real" -usually implying honest or self-disclosing and therefore risky-communication of life-enhancing merit depends on the underlying level of trust in the relationship of the communicators (Hayakawa, 1952, pp. 11-18, 105; Bateson, 1955, pp. 39-40; Buber, 1957, pp. 225-227; Rogers, 1961, p. 50; Satir, 1964) . The normally occurring level of this trust between people is thought to be low. Students are sent on "trust walks," do "trust falls," and complete other "trust building" exercises, because where there is no trust people engage in self-protective conversational games and descend to vacant cliché. These educational activities are somehow meant to model post-classroom exertions by the student to build trust in personal, organizational, and public life. As profound as all of this may be, "building trust" in science communication seems almost certain to fail in the span in which we should reduce global carbon emissions to two tons per person per year.
The truly enchanting melody of an appropriately pessimistic politics, not a siren's call, would be to, in Fisher and Ury's (1981) famous phrase, "proceed independent of trust" (p. 12). Every day people go forward in mistrust, sometimes to remarkable effect. We need not like each other, know one another especially well, and may, in fact, be justifiably suspicious of one another. But we can still engage. Climate change is a protracted negotiation about a shared future. This negotiation is already taking place in Bonn every spring, and in at least one other place during the year, every year. Those negotiations are our re-orientation. Read WallaceWells. Listen to his critics. No single piece of science about climate and environment must be trusted in order to continue to negotiate. The whole and only point is to negotiate, and we can do that despite our vaulting pessimism about trust and authority, and our misgivings about the lowered public status of science.
